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THE RETRIBUTIVE STRUCTURE OF
PUNISHMENT
N. S.

TIMASHEFF*

A Crime is committed. A social reaction follows. Punishment
is the name historically associated with this reaction.
The sequence Crime-Punishment seems to be as natural and
necessary as the sequence Stimulus-Response in an individual reflex. We might well speak of a Socio-Cultural Reflex of Punishment, the term "Socio-Cultural Reflex" being an abbreviation for
a sequence of acts of different individuals insofar as the previous
acts of the ones generally tend to provoke the subsequent acts of
the others.
In doing so, we must remember that the similarity is only superficial. In a sequence of the types studied neither stimuli nor responses are established by Nature, but are socially determined; the
link between them is formed not by natural, but by social forces;
coordinated dispositions of human wills based upon social interaction must exist in order to effectuate the social response.
What is socially determined in the sequence Crime-Punishment?
First of all, the punitive reaction. The nature and the aims of the
acts composing this reaction are in generally socially preestablished
and not left to the good pleasure of individuals: there are customary
or legal rules determining the response of Society to Crime.
Crime is also socially determined: customary or legal rules
trace the limit of punishable behavior, shape the "behavior-content"
of Criminal Law.' Many criminologists are unaware of this obvious
fact. The idea has been frequently expressed that Crime is determined in a "normative" way and that this hinders its causative
study. Consequently, some authors tried to discover a natural concept of Crime, which would be independent of Positive Law. 2 This
idea is, of course, erroneous: for Custom and Law are social phenomena; and the determination, by Custom or Law, of the limits
of punishable behavior is therefore a social process also.
Harvard University.
'Michael, J. and M. Adler, Crime, Law and Social Science, New York, 1933.
p. 20.
2 First of all, R. Garofalo, Criminologia (first Italian edition 1885; pp. 1-52 of
the fifth French edition, Paris, 1905).
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In the case of an inborn individual reflex, maladjustment between stimulus and response is impossible. It is already possible
within an acquired or conditional reflex: in certain cases the stimulus may be a false signal calling forth a response without biological
utility. Still more frequent are cases of maladjustment within a
socio-cultural reflex. In order to investigate the causes of possible
maladjustment within the sequence Crime-Punishment we have to
distinguish between its basic structure and very complex superstructures. A structure is basic if it is closely related to natural
tendencies of human behavior. Primitive structures, in which
Nature plays a larger role than Culture, are generally also basic
structures; but basic structures are, of course, to be discovered in
the midst of the later complex structures: for Nature cannot be
exterminated by Culture but may only be remoulded by it.
The basic structure of our sequence is the following one. Enduring interaction of individuals in social groups results in creating
an ethical group-conviction. The existence of such a conviction is
expressed in individual recognition of certain rules on the part of
group-members. It is not necessary that a rule should be recognized
by every group-member: the recognition by a majority is sufficient,
for it induces other group-members to act with a "concern" 3 for the
''common" recognition.
When a group-member recognizes an ethical rule, he adjusts his
behavior to its contents and tries to influence other group-members
to have their behavior adjusted to the rule. Such a will-disposition
is the essence of the recognition.
If an ethical rule has been transgressed or if a transgression has
become threatening, a hostile attitude of group-members follows:
4
this attitude forms a part of the behavior-complex of recognition.
In the early stages of development, before the formation of the
Socio-Cultural Reflex we are studying, the hostile attitude usually
resulted in individual hostile acts of the revenge type. The replacement of the individual reaction by a corporate one, the creation
of the socio-cultural reflex of Punishment, has been one of the
most decisive steps in the development of Culture. The primitive,
entirely egoistic motivation has been purified, sublimated, transformed into a social one.
3 T. N. Whitehead, Leadership in Free Society, Cambridge (Harvard University Press), 1936, p. 9.
4G. Humphrey, "The Conditioned Reflexes and the Elementary Social Reactions," Journal of Abnormal Psychology and Social Psychology, XVH (1922),
113-119.
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In spite of this transformation, transgression of recognized
ethical rules results in hostile attitudes; the sequence may be understood as a bundle of individual reflexes in which a single act (the
perpetration of a Crime) forms the stimulus and the hostile attitude
of an indeterminate number of group-members is the response.
These hostile attitudes would naturally tend to produce individual
hostile actions; but this tendency is inhibited by the expectancy of
corporate reaction. There exists a state of excitement, dissatisfaction.
The same act (crime) which has become the stimulus in the
first bundle of individual reflexes, plays the part of stimulus in a
complex behavior-system on the part of individuals who have to act
as "officials," executors of the corporate will (for a corporate action
is impossible without some organization). These sequences of acts
are regulated by customary or legal norms of conduct; generally
they result in inflicting on the offender the pain which according to
the socio-ethical conviction has been "merited" by him.
The knowledge of the activity of the officials tending towards
punishing the offender, and still more the knowledge that this purpose has been completely carried out, produces a state of relaxation,
satisfaction among group-members whose initial hostile attitude
had been inhibited by the expectation of the corporate action. These
hostile attitudes have been extinguished as well as if they had resulted in individual hostile acts. We might speak of a further
bundle of individual reflexes, in which the knowledge of the punitive acts of the officials form the stimulus, and conduct signifying
the recovery of confidence, of peace and quiet-the response.
All these reflex-bundles consist of acquired, or conditioned, rather
than of inborn, or unconditioned reflexes. According to the laws of
conditioned reflexes, a complete expression of the reflex implies its
reinforcement, whereas non-expression would mean inhibition or
even destruction. One of the elements in our chain has been a hostile
attitude towards the author of a Crime: but the hostile reaction is
nothing more than one of the elements in the recognition, which
means, from the individual point of view, the same as the ethical
group-conviction from the social one. Therefore, the realization of
the complex reflex-system we are studying results in reinforcing
the ethical group-conviction: the ethical group-conviction forms in
it the alpha and omega. We-are in the presence of a system of sociocultural "circular reflexes," analogous to individual circular reflexes
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studied by social psychology 5 The basic structure of the sequence
Crime-Punishment may be called the retributive structure.'
Not every time when the transgression of an ethical rule has
been followed by the infliction of a pain, is a circular reflex of the
above type produced. There is a natural law of adequacy, according to which the circular reflex is carried out and the ethical groupconviction reinforced only if a certain proportion between the evil
of the deed and the evil of the reaction has been present.
It depends upon the ethical group-conviction which viewpoints
are to be taken into consideration in comparing the two evils. In
the very beginning proportionality or adequacy was understood in
the most primitive way: objective equality between the former deed
and the later fate of the offender was requird. This is the rule of
material retaliation ("an eye for an eye, a life for a life"). Later
on material retaliation was replaced by ideal retaliation: not only
the objective value offended by the Crime, but also the intention of
offender was to be taken into consideration.7 On the other hand,
objective equality between the two evils was no longer exacted, but

only their similar position on the two scales of ethical values and of
the pains inflicted by society: offenses against higher values should
be retaliated by higher pains, offenses against minor values by
minor pains. Such is the principle of ideal retaliation. Many and
various degrees of development may be observed within this idealretributive structure; contemporary criminal law belongs, of course,
to the most refined of them. A further evolution towards replacing
ideal retribution by a teleological one, i. e., by treating offenders in
proportion to their social dangerousness, might follow and is, perhaps, already indicated by the modern reform movement in Criminology. But this is, of course, only a possibility, not yet an actuality.
How do we know all this? By studying Criminal Codes from
the earliest times down to our own days.8 All of them are constructed in the form of catalogues of possible crimes and of social
5 T. H. Allport, Social Psychology, 1924, p. 39.
eThe retributive structure of punishment has been passionately studied in
modem German science, cf. especially: . Schmidt, Aufgaben der Strafrechtspflege, Freiburg 1895; E. Beling, Die Vergeltung und ihre Bedeutung im Strafrechte, Tilbingen 1908; J.Nagler, Die Strafe, Vol. I, Leipzig 1918; A. Baumgarten,
'Das grundsgtzlich Neue im schweizer Strafgesetzentwurfe." Schweizer Zeitschrift flr Strafrecht, vol. 43 (1929); H. Drost, Das Ermessen des Richters, Berlin
1930.
7 3. Makariewicz, Einfihrung in die Philosophie des Strafrechts, Stuttgart,
1906, pp. 338-437.
8 Historical evidence for Egyptian, Hebrew, Greek, Roman, German and Arab
Law in L. GiInther, Die Idee der Wiedervergeltung, I (1899) 24, 43, 78, 65, 109.
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reactions against them: the higher the socio-ethical value injured
by a crime, the stronger the social reaction. Some modern criminologists deny universality to this basic structure, but in doing so,
they are confusing two viewpoints: that of what really exists in
Positive Law and that of what should exist. When antagonists of
the retributive structure are proceeding fairly, they must agree
that this structure plays at least a very important part in modern
criminal law. 9
In actuality, no other explanation of Criminal Codes than the
"retributive" one is possible: they were and still are constructed in
accordance with the idea of retributive punishment. Another explanation would perhaps be that of balancing, by differentiated pains,
various expectations of pleasure which might follow the commitment of crimes. But there is no reason to imagine that the satisfaction following the most "atrocious" (most severely punishable)
crimes would be the highest, or vice versa; the distribution of pains
would have to have been very different from that effectuated by
Criminal Codes to have made this theory defensible.
In actuality the idea of counterbalancing by pains the temptation of Crime always results in increasing immeasurably the severity
of punishment. Such was the Bavarian Code of 1813, created by
A. von Feuerbach, a protagonist of the theory of "psychological
coercion" (of potential criminals) ;10 such were the criminal laws of
the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Centuries, when the idea of terrorizing people by punishment was adopted by governments and
threatened to undermine the basic reflex of punishment. This was
an aberration in development; aberrations are unavoidable insofar
as social development is effected by the trial-and-error method, and
that is, of course, the case in the developing of punishment. The
penal philosophy of the Eighteenth Century (Beccaria) and the
adjustment of penal legislation to it" have reestablished the dominance of the basic structure.
The very possibility of overcoming the retributive structure of
punishment is doubtful. First of all, as has already been said, the
concrete rules of adequacy are changeable, and a new "teleological
retaliation" is imaginable, realizing, in a certain degree, the aspirations of the reformers. Secondly, recent events have testified that
9 J. Michael and M. Adler, op. cit. p. 374.
lo Cf. G. Radbruch, P. J. A. Feuerbach. Ei Juristenleben, Vienna 1934;
S. Blohrn, Feuerbach und das Reichsstrafgesetzbuch, Breslau 1935.

11 Penal codes of Toscana 1786, of Austria 1787, of France 1791, of Prussia (in
the AIlgemeines Landrecht, in force since 1794).
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even the boldest reformers dare not break completely with the
tradition based upon retaliation.
In 1921 in Italy a Draft Criminal Code was published, produced
by the leaders of the "positive" school, who are horrified by the very
idea of retaliation.12 It was only the general part, dealing with crime
and punishment in general; the special part, which, normally, consists of the above mentioned catalogues, has never appeared; but
many clauses of the general part have permitted the assumption
that, in the mind of the reformers, the special part was to have
consisted of a catalogue of the normal type: only under this assumption may the detailed and complex rules of the Draft concerning
the increase and decrease of normal punishment be understood.
In 1930 in Russia a Draft Criminal Code was elaborated by
Krylenko, now Federal Commissar for Justice."3 This Draft completely eliminated the principles of adequacy and retribution: the
catalogue of punishable acts no longer included sanctions corresponding to each of them; social reaction had to be determined
merely from the viewpoint of the social dangerousness of the offender. But this Draft was never enacted, and it is very improbable
that it would be enacted now when many concessions to tradition
have already been made by the Communist Government.
Rules concerning adequacy might vary and replace one another.
But the general law of adequacy remains immutably in force. It is
a kind of natural law; attempts to avoid it result in socio-pathological phenomena. If in general, repression does not follow Crime
or if Punishment is obviously below the degree indicated by the
rule of adequacy (with regard to the socio-ethical evaluations of the
epoch), a tendency towards restoring private individual reaction
appears: this is the root of "Lynch Justice." If repression becomes
obviously too severe as compared with that demanded by the socioethical evaluations punishment does not result in reinforcing the
ethical group conviction, but, on the contrary, it produces collective
sentiments which rather undermine it: offenders are considered
"victims" and governmental agents applying punishment tyrants.14
12 Cf. Sh. Glueck, "Principles of a Rational Penal Code," 41 Harvard Law
Review 453 ff. 1 (1928).
13 The Draft has been published in "Sovetskaia Justitsia," 1930 No. 19. Cf. N.
Timasheff, "L'Evolutione del diritto penale sovietico" in Rivista Italiana di diritto
penale, Vol. 4 (1932) pp. 188-9; MUller, "Die Entwickelung des sowietrussischen
Strafrechts," Archiv iir Criminalpsychologie und Strafrechtsreform, Vol. 21 (1930),
pp. 650-2.
14In Russia, where, until the middle of the Nineteenth Century, the criminal
law remained extremely severe, the common name for convicts was "unfor-
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In the early stages of development there are no causes for lack
of adjustment within the Crime--Punishment sequence. With the
advance of social evolution the primary structure is complicated by
certain superstructures, and this sometimes results in maladjustment within the circular reflex.
Applying punishment to transgressions of ethical rules becomes
one of the functions of political power. In the beginning political
power proceeded rather by means of selection: only rules already
created and recognized by unorganized social interaction were given
the sanction of legal punishment; legislation, if there was any, was
nothing more than a corroboration and a clarification of the often
unprecise group-conviction.
A second process was soon added to selection: that of assimilation. The primitive political power possessed already a defensesystem, which consisted of displaying naked power against every
person who offended against the interests of the power or endangered them. Gradually this informal defense-system was transformed into a complex of rules of the same type as those constituting the ethical group-conviction and endowed with the same sanctions.'5 In this way certain rules have been "assimilated" to those
which have been created by primary interaction. Later on, with
the development of the state and of its functions, the number of
assimilated rules has tremendously increased; now they constitute
the major part of all the rules endowed with punitive sanctions.
With regard to the primary structure, these rules are merely the
amplification of the command to obey established authorities. This
fact is generally expressed in the following incorrect form: legal
rules only partially correspond to ethical rules; a certain number of
them are neutral from the ethical point of view; in extreme cases
they are even opposed to moral rules.
What is the game of the political power when it tries to assimilate new rules to the original ones? It is introducing new rules into
the circular reflex of Crime-Punishment and in this way reinforcing them. Punishment, within the basic structure, is a symptom of
social disapproval of the deed committed by the punished individual;
the connection between crime and punishment, within the basic
structure, is so narrow, that social repulsion is often transferred
from the offender to the punished: it is well known how difficult it
tunates." Cf. N. D. Sergeievsky,. Russian Criminal Law (in Russian).
burg 1911, pp. 87, 173.

St. Peters-

15 Nowhere has the evolution been so obvious, as in Roman Law. Cf. Th.
Mommsen, R6mishes Strafrecht, Leipzig 1899, pp. 35-54.
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is for a punished individual to join again his social group which is
inclined to treat him as an outsider; the rehabilitation of offenders
is one of the most difficult problems of practical criminology.
Having been punished is, for group opinion, equivalent with
having transgressed the ethical group-conviction. In creating new
types of punishable behavior political power reckons upon the substitution, and hopes that popular resentment will reinforce newly
created rules.
Very often such a calculation is corroborated by events. First
of all, new rules might be in conformity with the trend of evolution
of the ethical group-conviction; in such cases we have to deal rather
with a continued selection than with assimilation. Secondly, political power sometimes plays successfully the part of socio-ethical
leaders: its acts are corroborated by influential group-members,
and group-conviction is correspondingly modified. Finally, if new
rules are introduced with necessary care, if obvious conflicts with
existing convictions are avoided and if new rules are not too
numerous, the assimilation process takes place also.
But with political power the illusion of being all-powerful is
too easily associated. It seems that political power possesses the
force to compel everybody to act in accordance with patterns established by force, especially if transgression is followed by the infliction of sanctions. Revolutionary governments as well as autocratic
ones during periods of reformatory zeal act very often under the
influence of this illusion; sometimes democratic governments also.
They introduce new rules of conduct endowed with penal sanctions
and hope that these rules will gradually be included in the ethical
group-conviction and be reinforced by the circular reflex of CrimePunishment. The actual result is sometimes a quite different one:
acts of arbitrary punishment, based on such rules, are estimated,
within the group, as inadequate, unjust ones; they may introduce
the fear motive within the consciousness of group members and
prevent some of them from transgressing the new rules; but they
remain outside the circular reflex and sometimes result in undermining in general the ethical group-conviction. The experience with
Prohibition in the United States has been a very conclusive one in
this respect.Y
In such cases the cause of maladjustment is that one of the
elements of the circular reflex has been determined by a social
group other than the basic one: the holders of political power form
I8Michael and Adler, p. 239.
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a special group, of course closely related to the larger "society," but
obviously endowed with a special group spirit and interests, and
developing according to special laws.
Trouble and maladjustment arise also from another side: that
of determining the nature and the aims of punishment. Insofar as
the basic structure alone is in force, the concrete aims of punishment are determined in a rather unprecise way: 17 an evil more
or less proportionate to the evil of the deed should follow the
Crime and nothing more
With the development and refinement of socio-ethical conviction, imprisonment has become the central element within the punitive system. Stress must be laid upon the point that this happened
not because a conviction of the excellency of imprisonment had
arisen, but because imprisonment alone was left when the two main
penal methods which earlier prevailed, capital and corporal punishment, had been respectively greatly curtailed and almost abolished.
No special aim was attributed to imprisonment by the ethical groupconviction when it was suddenly given first place.
When imprisonment became the central point of the punitive
system, a new social group arose, formed by the best, most humane
and most farsighted officers of prison administration. With the historical aim of reinforcing ethical group-conviction, they tried to
combine other aims concerning first of all the criminals subjected to
their treatment: the idea of reforming offenders by imprisonment
was created in this way. Experience has shown that reformation,
by existing methods, is possible in certain cases only. A movement
has later arisen (in the 70's and 80's of the last century) for transforming the traditional punitive system in order to make it an adequate and general instrument of reformation; the idea of segregating persistent offenders was added to the program. In many countries the movement has been supported by the intellectual elite and
has influenced Positive Law.
Consequently, in contemporary law the nature and aims of
punishment are still socially determined, but this determination is
often the result of the deliberations and convictions of special elites,
no longer of the "society" in its totality."
17Cf. 0. Kinberg. "fiber die relative Bedeutung der Generalprevention und
der Specialprevention," Monatsschrift fizr Criminalpsychologie und Strafrechtsreform, XXI (1930), 470.
18 This results sometimes in complete failure of measures which seemed to be
very well motivated. A good example is the failure of special measures directed

towards "persistent offenders." These measures have been introduced in positive
law, but have been rejected by "public opinion" expressing the ethical group-
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Intentional social determination has become a function of political power and of special elites not only within the complex of
questions we are studying. But in our case the situation is a
peculiar one.
The types of punishable behavior are now determined by political power more frequently than by society as a whole. The nature
and aims of punishment are now determined by special elites. But
the whole society is the object to be influenced by this determination: every group member is a potential criminal in the sense that
an unfavorable constellation of circumstances might incite him to
commit a crime; the control of the motivations of an average group
member, not that of a member of the active power centre or of an
elite is the aim. Furthermore, society as a whole is the bearer of
the mechanism of preventing crime: the ethical group-conviction
reinforced by the circular reflex of Crime-Punishment. Reinforcing
this conviction, at least not undermining it should be the first principle of the rational social defense against crime.
The conclusion is not at all to return to the basic structure in its
old form, but: acting with a regard for and an understanding of this
structure. New types of punishable behavior should be introduced
only in cases where imposing certain types of behavior has become
an obvious social necessity (and not merely a transitory caprice of
the' legislator) and when it is completely impossible to achieve it
by other means (by so-called indirect motivation). New forms of
treating criminals should be introduced with caution, with due regard to the natural laws ruling the socio-cultural reflex of Crime
and Punishment. Would it be of great help if in reforming 100
actual criminals we should destroy the preventive mechanism of
group conviction and transform 1000 potential criminals into actual
ones?
conviction and have in practice remained unapplied. Cf. for France (law of 1885)
R. Heindl, Der Berufsverbrecher, Berlin 1927, p. 136-7; for Norway (law of 1902)
K. Wilmans, Die verminderte Zurechnungsfihigkeit, Berlin 1927, p. 322-3; for
England (law of 1908), Report of the Departmental Committee on Persistent
Offenders, May, 1932, Printed and published by His Majesty's Stationery Office,
London, 1932.

